CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

EXPEDIENCY

OF A

SPANISH WAR, &c.

[Price ONE SHILLING.]

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SPANISH WAR.

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REFLECTIONS

ON THE

EXPEDIENCY

OF

NEGOCIATION

WITH

SPAIN, &c.

BY

CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
EXPEDIENCY
OF A
SPANISH WAR:
CONTAINING
REFLECTIONS
ON THE
Late DEMANDS of SPAIN;
And on the
NEGOCIATIONS
OF
Monſ. BUSSY.

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CONSIDERATIONS

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THERE has not been any political report since the beginning of the present war, that has occasioned more conversation or surprize, than the late rumour, that we are on the brink of having one with *Spain*; it is now the subject

ſubject of debate in every coffee-houſe in *London*: politicians harangue on it, and even the miniſters themſelves *drop very broad hints*. * * * * * * * * * * * Perhaps it will not be thought either impertinent or unſeaſonable to make a few enquiries on a point at once ſo inviting and important.

It cannot be ſuppoſed that a nation, which has hitherto preſerved a great character for the juſtneſs of its politics, will ruſh into a war without ſome view in ſo doing; it may be falſe—and under the preſent circumſtances of affairs, it is my intention to ſhew that it really is ſo. Some people, either from diſaffection to our government, or from a love of ſingularity, pretend to pronounce this nation ruined if the *Spaniards* undertake a war againſt us: they tell us, that prolonging the war alone, even though it might prove ſucceſsful, muſt, in the end, beggar us; and that this is the view of the court of *Spain*; and its motive they aſcribe to a jealouſy

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of our preſent formidable ſituation in *America*. It muſt be owned, that when the balance of power is in danger, it is the wiſeſt precaution for neutral nations to throw their weight into the ſinking ſcale; but this maxim can then only be defended in point of prudence, when ſuch neutral nations have ſome proſpect of ſucceeding in their intention.

Great Britain may at preſent be truly eſteemed the moſt powerful monarchy in *Europe*; and her power is of that kind which muſt be the moſt formidable to *Spain*. A war therefore between theſe two kingdoms will neceſſarily be a naval one, in which we have every thing to expect to gain, and the *Spaniards* every thing to loſe. Our marine was never ſo powerful, and has very little to do. In the *Eaſt Indies*, our enemies the *French* are demoliſhed; ſo that a ſmall ſquadron is ſufficient for that ſtation. In the *Weſt Indies*, our only view is to protect our own trade, and deſtroy that of the *French*, who have no

fleet

fleet to oppose us. In *Europe*, their marine is ruined; and if we now and then hear of a little parade of a naval equipment at *Brest* or *Toulon*, we very well know it is all puff, and that they have no sailors to man the few rotten ships which have escaped our men of war. As the *French* have therefore no force to oppose to ours, we can with little or no addition of expence employ it against the *Spaniards*. It is very well known that much the greatest part of the revenue of that crown arises from the King's share of the gold and silver which is dug in their mines of *South America*; and that these treasures are brought home in squadrons they call their Flota of galleons. These have a long voyage to make before they reach *Old Spain*; and consequently are liable to the chance of being intercepted and seized by any nation superior to themselves at sea. That we possess this superiority is well known; for although the *Spanish* navy is considerable amongst the other maritime powers

powers of *Europe*, yet it is nothing when compared with the fleets of *Great Britain*.

Another plain reaſon againſt their entering into a war with us, is the weakneſs of their moſt valuable ſettlements in *America*. Their iſlands are almoſt open to our fleets; and expeditions againſt them at preſent would be much eaſier to us than at the opening of a war: as we have a vaſt force in *North America* ready to be tranſported on any new ſervice, and a fleet ready to co-operate. The expedition in the laſt war under Lord *Anſon*, to the *South Sea*, is a proof how weak the *Spaniards* are in that quarter, and with how much eaſe a ſquadron of enemy's ſhips would there throw them into the greateſt diſorder. It may perhaps be replied that commodore *Anſon* did not find that voyage ſo very practicable: but it is very well known that the calamities which attended it were mostly owing to the not timing it properly; a misfortune of which we ſhould now reap

an advantage; as the very ingenious writer of the account of that voyage, has laid down particular directions for conducting a fleet the ſame way; directions founded on dear-bought experience in that memorable expedition. When once they had paſſed thoſe fatal ſtreights, all obſtacles were removed, and nothing gave them leſs trouble than the reſiſtance of the enemy.

As to the *Spaniſh* trade in *Europe* it would be very ſoon deſtroyed by our privateers; and the wealthy part of that nation thereby ſoon involved in poverty. It may be ſaid that we ſhould experience the ſame inconveniences from a war; but in anſwer to that; we may be very well aſſured, that we ſhould have greatly the advantage, and for this reaſon; we have at preſent a multitude of privateers ready fitted out for the ſea; not only thoſe built by ourſelves, but a vaſt number that we have taken from the *French*; whereas the enemy would have all thoſe preparations to make

which we already poſſeſs: and muſt greatly damage their trade themſelves in converting merchants ſhips into privateers. Being before-hand is a very great point in ſuch undertakings as theſe; and all this advantage would be entirely on our ſide. In reſpect to the deſtroying each other's trade, both nations would certainly ſuffer greatly, but ſurely there would be no ſort of proportion between them: Our navy ſo immenſely ſuperior to that of the enemy; ready for action on a day's warning; our privateers in the ſame readineſs, would certainly give us a vaſt advantage. But if ſucceſs in this reſpect was to be equal, a ſuppoſition which can hardly be allowed, yet we could much better carry on a naval war, equal in its circumſtances, than the enemy.

Great Britain is a kingdom that does not only ſubſiſt on an immenſe foreign trade, but, in a very great meaſure, on the landed intereſt of the nation, in its manu-

manufactures, and inland trade; which is not the case with *Spain*. Manufactures they have few or none: no inland trade; and the landed interest in *Spain* is very poor; but few of their taxes being laid on that body of the people. The wealth of that kingdom depends almost entirely on its *American* colonies, and on its trade to *Great Britain*. Under these circumstances, it is very evident, which nation must feel most the loss of its trade. But to wave a supposition which my argument has no sort of reason to allow, as it is founded on impossibility; how will the *Spaniards* be able to carry on a naval war with us, without this proportion in the losses of the two nations? Our vast marine is too formidable for their's to hazard an engagement; and when that is the case, their fleets must keep their ports, and their endeavours must be directed to protect their trade; a task which will be utterly impossible, when they have to contend with such a force as ours.

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In the present state of affairs in *Italy*, it is more than possible, that the court of *Spain* may be in fear for the establishments she has there procured for her young Princes. The Empress Queen has an undoubted right to the dutchies of *Parma*, *Placentia*, and *Guastalla*; and when she has got clear of the present war in *Germany*, she may very possibly assert that right, and attack the present possessor: in such a war, the king of *Sardinia*, it is to be supposed, would not assist the cause of *Spain*, for reasons which must be evident to every one; and when the *British* fleets are masters of the *Mediterranean*, and his *Sardinian* Majesty of the passage into Italy by land, in what manner can the court of *Spain* assist her allies in that country.

If we consider the present situation of affairs in *Italy*, there will appear great reason to expect a war soon in that quarter. When one power keeps possession of territories, which, by right, belong to another,

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and that other power ſtrong enough to diſpute the uſurpation, we may depend upon it, that a war is not at a great diſtance; particular circumſtances may prevent any monarch from aſſerting his rights, the moment they are invaded; but when thoſe circumſtances no longer ſubſiſt, we generally find, that Princes ſeldom give up their pretenſions, when they are founded in juſtice. But, not to inſiſt on general maxims, is the Empreſs Queen a likely princeſs to prove ſo tame in this affair, when ſhe has finiſhed her preſent war with his *Pruſſian* Majeſty? is ſhe not rather very ambitious, and jealous to the laſt degree of her rights, even if they are dubious! How improbable, therefore, is it, that ſhe ſhould overlook this manifeſt invaſion of them! ſo very unlikely, that it is not to be expected: and the natural conſequence of her aſſerting them, is an *Italian* war. The King of *Sardinia* has been ſome time making ſuch preparations as have been noiſed about all *Europe*. He has not only completed all his old regiments,

ments, but raiſed many new ones; ſo that at this time he has above ſixty thouſand men in arms, and which are ready to march at a very ſhort warning. That monarch, in thus ſtrengthening himſelf, ſhews his political forecaſt, and the depth of his views: he knows very well, that in caſe an *Italian* war ſhould happen, his friendſhip is of equal importance to either party; and that ſuch a war as this is likely to be, cannot but turn out to his advantage, if he is prepared for it.

As an *Italian* war ſeems ſo very probable; nay, ſo very certain; it is almoſt impoſſible for the court of *Spain* to keep clear of it, as it certainly is not for her intereſt that the preſent ſyſtem of affairs there ſhould be overturned. Now the evident diſadvantages ſhe muſt labour under in ſuch a war, with *Great Britain* for her enemy, are immenſe! Every embarkation of troops which ſhe makes, will be ſubject to attacks from the *Britiſh* fleets. The whole kingdom of *Naples* would be

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under the command of a few *English* bomb veſſels; as they would at any time have it in their power to lay the fine city of *Naples* in aſhes: an inſtance of which actually happened when Commodore *Martin* obtained a neutrality for that whole kingdom in leſs than four hours, with ſo ſmall a force as three ſhips. Are not theſe circumſtances of the moſt important nature in a war between *Spain* and *Great Britain*?

It may perhaps be ſaid that I have not given a fair ſtate of the caſe; for that *Spain* would have the aſſiſtance of *France* in ſuch a war, which proved of ſo much conſequence to them in the former. Let us now enquire into the advantages that would accrue to *Spain* from an alliance with *France*.

It is certainly very true, that ſuch an alliance in the laſt war was of very great ſervice to them both; but would the

the caſe be the ſame now? is *France*, at preſent, the power ſhe was twenty years ago; is ſhe, in her preſent diſtreſſed condition, able to protect the extenſive, but unwieldy monarchy of *Spain* againſt the formidable power of *Great Britain*? in the laſt war, *France* had by much the beſt ſide of the queſtion; but in this ſhe has met with nothing but a ſucceſſion of misfortunes. When *Spain* joined *France* before, ſhe was in poſſeſſion of a flouriſhing marine; but now ſhe has not ten ſhips manned! then her armies were powerful, and her generals ſucceſsful; and moreover ſhe was in poſſeſſion of a flouriſhing trade. But none of theſe circumſtances now ſubſiſt. Her armies had never worſe ſucceſs; her generals leſs credit; or her ſubjects leſs trade. Her power in the *Weſt Indies*, in the neighbourhood of the *Spaniſh* colonies, was then very conſiderable; all her colonies in general were in a proſperous ſituation; in a word, ſhe was a formidable power. At preſent, her trade

trade in general is utterly ruined, and ſo little of her navy remains, that ſhe could not lend the *Spaniards* a ſingle man of war to convoy their galleons. In the *Weſt Indies*, we are in poſſeſſion of the moſt conſiderable ſugari-ſland ſhe had, and our fleet keeps the reſt in awe, and ruins the remains of her commerce; ſo that what ſugars ſhe has, are diſadvantageouſly brought home in foreign bottoms. In *North America* ſhe is undone, as much ſo as conqueſt can make her; and in the *Eaſt Indies*, the moſt important of her fortreſſes are all in our poſſeſſion; ſo that nothing but the name of her *India* Company remains. Her trade in *Europe* is reduced to nothing; even her very coaſting trade is almoſt deſtroyed. The immenſe expence ſhe has been at to proſecute the war in *Germany*, and in paying ſubſidies to the *Auſtrians*, *Ruſſians*, *Swedes*, and other *German* Princes, have quite impoveriſhed her; there cannot be ſtronger proof of this poverty than the general

languor

languor which appears in every branch of their adminiſtration: the Duke de *Belleiſle*, in his letters to Marſhal *Contades*, expreſſes how exceſſively in want of money his department was two years ago, and their ſending even their plate to the mint is very expreſſive of this poverty. What perhaps is as fatal as any part of theſe misfortunes, is the unſteadineſs and uncertainty of their government. When the government of a nation lies in the hands of a weak capricious woman, who makes every thing of the greateſt importance give way to her own humour, caprice, and intereſt; that nation, if an arbitrary monarchy, muſt be in the greateſt danger of ruin. This is the caſe in *France*; and while the people lie under the moſt oppreſſive burden, and the lands in general lie uncultivated, their armies are attended with the worſt ſucceſs, and the ſpirits of their ſoldiery ſo depreſſed, that their great ſuperiority of numbers can give them little advantage.

This is the ſtate of that nation, to join whom *Spain* is to renounce her preſent happy condition, and involve herſelf in a war that *muſt* prove deſtructive. Sure at firſt ſight the difference between an alliance in the *laſt* war and *now* muſt be evident. *France* is no longer the power that ſhe was; and beſides, there were ſeveral other circumſtances in reſpect to the reſt of the powers of *Europe*, at that time, which are now changed, and all conſpire to render it infinitely impolitic in the court of *Spain* to enter into ſo diſadvantageous an alliance. In the laſt war *France* aſſiſted *Spain*, but in this *Spain* muſt ſupport *France*.

It has been further ſaid, that *France* is to yield up the iſland of *Minorca* to the *Spaniards*, in conſideration of the aſſiſtance ſhe is to receive from that nation. This is a pretty equivalent truly for giving away their trade, and perhaps bringing themſelves to the brink of ruin! *Mi-*

norca

norca is not worth the keeping to *Spain*, if ſhe could ſink it to the bottom of the ſea; and the only reaſon for her to wiſh to be repoſſeſſed of it, is to prevent any body elſe having it. Sure this paltry iſland can never be deemed an equivalent for the loſſes ſhe would ſuſtain in a ruinous war.

Another reaſon which is urged by ſome for the court of *Spain*'s taking this ſtep, is the preſent flouriſhing ſtate of our colonies in *America*, from which they may take umbrage, as fearing the balance of power deſtroyed *there*, and their own ſettlements in danger. It will be a very eaſy matter to anſwer this. In ſome caſes it certainly is the beſt policy in neutral nations to aſſiſt the weaker power; for inſtance, it was very ill judged in *Oliver Cromwell* to make an alliance with *France* againſt *Spain*, becauſe only the name remained of the latter power, and he was frightened at the idea of the vaſt power *Spain* had ſo lately exerted to the terror of

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the greateſt part of *Europe*. *France* was then a riſing power, and the penetrating politicians of thoſe days predicted the ill conſequences of that alliance. Had *Cromwell* joined *Spain*, his power would have been ſuch an acceſſion as would more than have balanced the two belligerent nations, and might in its conſequences have ſtopped the faſt growth of the *French* monarchy. But the Protector was obliged as it were to take one part in the quarrel, for he knew the turbulent ſpirit of the people he governed, and perceived the neceſſity of engaging them in a foreign war, that they might not be at leiſure to form conſpiracies againſt his own government; ſo that he found himſelf obliged to enter into a war, and the point was only what power to join.

But in the caſe before us, the *Spaniards* have no reaſonable pretext to go to war at all. The notion of the balance of power being deſtroyed, is meerly ideal.

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Was this nation an abſolute monarchy, and an ambitious King on the throne, they might perhaps have ſome cauſe for ſuch a fear; but conſidering our government, and the known character which this nation has over all *Europe* for an honourable and faithful obſervation of treaties, can they have any fears of this kind, ſuppoſing this balance *was* deſtroyed? But how can any ſuch fact be proved? This notion was never thought of before the late conqueſt of *Canada*; and has that event been of ſuch immenſe importance to the *Spaniards* as to endanger their colonies? So far from it, the *Spaniſh* ſettlements are infinitely more rich than ours; perhaps they are not of ſuch advantage to a commercial nation, but yet the revenue which the King of *Spain* draws from their mines, might give us much more reaſon for fear of this kind than they can have on our account. Such fear muſt ariſe from a notion of ambitious deſigns in the court of *England*, and not from the flouriſhing ſtate of our trade; now in the

firſt caſe, it is the King's revenue which they would have the greateſt reaſon to fear, which cannot be the caſe with us, by reaſon of the government which ſubſiſts in *England*; for let our trade be ever ſo extenſive, it will not give our Sovereign the leaſt addition of extraordinary power. But how can it be ſaid that there is any balance at all deſtroyed? The cultivated part of *North America* is not of near the extent that the *Spaniſh* part of *South America* is; and ſurely the riches of it will not bear a compariſon. How then can the balance be deſtroyed? for what *North America* may be to us ſome centuries hence, cannot be deemed a reaſonable pretence for going to war with us at preſent. As I juſt now obſerved, had this balance been in danger, there certainly would have been a great deal to apprehend from the character and government of this nation. This is a point of more importance than at firſt it may appear to be. Is there not, in ſuch a caſe, more danger from a monarchy

narchy like that of *France*, than from ſuch a republic as *Holland*, ſuppoſing at the ſame time the latter to be as powerful as the former?

I think therefore I have pretty fully proved how extremely empty and ridiculous any reaſons are, that might be given by the partiſans of *Spain*, for entering into a war with us. No ſtep could poſſibly be more abſurd, as none can by any means prove ſo ruinous to *Spain*; every advantage that any nation can enjoy from peace, the *Spaniards* are at preſent in poſſeſſion of; and what is it that ſhe would have in exchange for this greateſt of all bleſſings? nothing that is by any means an equivalent. During a naval war with ſo powerful a nation as we are by ſea, they would be one of the pooreſt and weakeſt nations in *Europe*. The arrival of their galleons would be rendered very uncertain; and in the nature of things would now and then be intercepted. Their whole trade would

very ſoon be ruined, and a vaſtly important branch of it, that with us, which is the beſt part of their *European* commerce, entirely loſt at once, which would greatly diſtreſs them; add to this, their inability to interfere in the affairs of *Italy*, if we were their enemies; and their having a ruined nation, ſuch as *France*, to protect.

The court of *Spain*, it ſeems, thought the terms on which the *French* in the late negociation offered to agree to a peace, reaſonable; and, in a *memorial*, which they preſented by their Ambaſſador, *threatened us with a* WAR *if we did not comply with them*; they further demanded for *themſelves* a ſhare in the *Newfoundland fiſhery*, and to have the whole *Logwood trade* ſecured to them!

For the *Spaniards* thus inſolently to interfere in our conteſt with *France*, is an inſult we *ought not* to bear. Can they imagine

imagine that we ſhould fling away the conqueſts we have made, to oblige them? Monſ. *Buſſy* in his late negociation, with regard to the affairs of *North America*, offered to give up *Canada*, on condition that the bounds of *Louiſiana* ſhould be enlarged and ceded to *France*; and as a ſecurity for our colonies, they agreed to give us a barrier to them. They further inſiſted on having the iſle *Sable* for the conveniency of drying their fiſh. Theſe articles were the hinges on which the negociation turned, and which the *Spaniſh* miniſtry think ſo very reaſonable.

The original motive of our going to war with *France*, was, the danger our *North American colonies* were in from the incroachments of the *French*. The value of our ſettlements was well known, and it was very clearly perceived, that we muſt either go into a war with our perfidious neighbours, or yeild them up a conſidelable ſhare of our maritime colonies. The

fortune of the war has thrown the whole advantage into our hands, and we have ſecured our colonies by the conqueſt of thoſe which the *French* poſſeſſed there; and her very neighbourhood was what endangered ours before.—And ſhall we now be ſo mad as to lay the foundations of a future war by yielding up our conqueſts at a peace? Our ſettlements cannot poſſibly be of half the value to us while another nation is in poſſeſſion of the back country. Their ſituation will always enable them to command the inland trade of all *North America*; and what is of more conſequence, they will command the *Indians* of the whole country: by their means they will at any time be able to make war on us without appearing in it themſelves, and conſequently without apparently breaking any treaties. An *Indian* war immediately deſolates all our back-ſettlements, and the produce of many hundred miles of territory is loſt at once. It is a ſtroke of policy in our government,

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and it is alſo juſt, to prevent the colonies raiſing manufactures that may interfere with thoſe of their mother country. Now no reſtrictions will ſo thoroughly prevent this, as keeping poſſeſſion of all *North America*; and for a very evident reaſon. Manufactures require a great number of hands, collected in a ſmall compaſs; and univerſally thrive beſt in kingdoms of ſmall extent. In *North America*, adjoining to our ſettlements, are immenſe uncultivated tracts of land, very proper for producing the ſame articles, as thoſe we already cultivate: if there was no enemy to ſtop the planters progreſs, theſe lands would very ſoon be overſpread with planters from our ſettlements; and when every man might have as much land as he pleaſed for nothing, it would be an abſolute impoſſibility to raiſe a ſingle manufacture. All mankind, when the choice is before them, prefer freedom to ſervitude; every man, as ſoon as he had raiſed a trifling ſum, would turn planter. The workmen

of

of a manufacture muſt neceſſarily have good wages. The amount of theſe alone, would ſoon ruin the work, as the men would continually be turning planters. It is unknown, but eaſily conjectured, what a vaſt quantity of our manufactures would be expended throughout theſe immenſe regions, if they were once begun to be planted. This advantage will be entirely loſt, if we yield them up to the *French*.

The advocates for this fatal meaſure, give, as a reaſon for their opinion, the danger there would be of our *North American* colonies throwing off the yoke of their mother country, if ſuch an immenſe acceſſion of territory was to be added to what they already poſſeſs. But the inſufficiency of this argument is anſwered in a moment. I may ſafely venture an aſſertion, which, upon conſideration, will be found true; that there is more danger of this happening now, than if all *North America* was to be added to them at a peace;

peace; and for the ſame reaſon that they would not be able to raiſe manufactures. To throw off the yoke, if it can be called one, would require a very deep laid conſpiracy, and an union among all the governments there. Now it is very well known, how difficult it would be, to form a conſpiracy in a country that has no towns, except a few ſea ports; and where all, or at leaſt, much the greateſt part of the inhabitants, are ſcattered over ſuch an immenſe continent; is not the very idea of ſuch a revolt abſurd to the laſt degree? And the danger, if there was any, is greater *now*; becauſe the inhabitants are more collected. Another thing which would make ſuch an affair impoſſible, is the nature of the different governments of our colonies; all of them jealous, and envious of one another to the greateſt degree. We have the ſtrongeſt proofs which experience can give, how little they could be united at the beginning of this war againſt a common enemy that was at their very doors.

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We know that they all caſt the moſt jealous eye on their governors, and in ſhort are, in their own policy, quite divided into tribes of ſeparate people; yet theſe are all to unite at once againſt their mother country, to bring down forces from the moon, to form conſpiracies by the force of magic, in order to revolt from the firſt maritime power in the univerſe.

Is there not much greater danger of the *Spaniſh colonies* revolting, than of ours? Do not their's abound with gold and ſilver, which will purchaſe every thing elſe? Are not all their immenſe dominions united under one government? is not the treatment they receive from their mother country, much more ſevere, than any thing of that kind felt by ours? Why, therefore, do not they revolt? Becauſe the court of *Spain* puts it entirely out of their power, by taking a few plain and ſimple precautions; they change their viceroys every three years; they change the troops they

employ

employ there frequently, and ſeldom let them remain long at one place. Does not this clearly prove that we may very eaſily enſure the fidelity of our colonies, by changing our governors, or, in fact, by letting the ſeveral governments remain on their preſent footing? I think, therefore, that the notion of letting the *French* remain in *North America*, on this pretence, is founded on no reaſon that has even the appearance of truth.

The next article which the court of *Spain* is ſo *modeſt* as to expect we ſhould agree to, is letting the *French* continue to poſſeſs a ſhare in the *Newfoundland fiſhery*, to which they have no ſort of right, and all which they would be ſure to uſurp. It is very plain that the true intereſt of *Great Britain* is to prevent the *French* from ever becoming a maritime power. We cannot poſſibly hinder their building ſhips, but we have it now in our power to prevent their raiſing ſailors. The great

nurſery for them is this fiſhery, which conſtantly, before the war, maintained *France* 20,000 annually, beſides their gaining a million and a half of our money. The prodigious importance of this fiſhery muſt therefore appear at once towards raiſing a naval power. The *French*, by treaty, had only a right to a ſhare of it; but by means of the near neighbourhood of *Louiſburg* they uſurped very near the whole, and by that means gained all the principal markets in *Europe* from us. A naval power depends entirely on trade, and that trade is the moſt advantageous which employs the moſt ſeamen. The advantage of the poſſeſſion of this fiſhery therefore will very clearly appear; and the bad policy of yielding again to *France* a ſhare in it, is ſo evident, that no conſideration whatever ſhould induce us to ſuch a conceſſion.

As to the demand of the court of *Spain*, for a ſhare of this fiſhery for *themſelves*, it

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is a demand not founded on any right; for the *Engliſh* were in poſſeſſion of the ſouthern parts of this iſland long before the *Spaniards* ever thought of fiſhing there. In the treaty of 1713, they endeavoured to eſtabliſh their pretended right, but could only get this clauſe inſerted, which left the right juſt where it was before: "And as on the part of *Spain*, "it is inſiſted, that the *Biſcayners*, and other "ſubjects of his Catholic Majeſty, have "an undoubted right of fiſhing on the "banks of *Newfoundland*, her Majeſty of "*Great Britain* conſents and agrees, that "all privileges *which can juſtly be claimed*, "be preſerved inviolable to the *Biſcayners*, "and other inhabitants of *Spain*." The *Spaniards* ſince that time have never proſecuted a *cod-fiſhery*, nor have their pretended rights ever been more ſolidly eſtabliſhed by treaty. The granting them their demands now, would therefore only raiſe up *two* rivals in this valuable commerce againſt ourſelves, which would be of much

much worſe conſequence than could poſſibly reſult from a war with *Spain*. I ſhall not enquire into their right to the *logwood-trade*, as I make very little doubt but that point might be ſettled with great eaſe; but the others are of a more important nature, and which we cannot give up while we retain the leaſt regard for our own intereſt.

The advocates for our agreeing to the terms required by the court of *Spain*, tell us, that the *Spaniſh* miniſtry delaying a war with us, till we were on the verge of a peace with *France*, acted very politically, as their view was to reduce our overgrown power;—for now, by entering into the war, they will, in all probability, protract it till we, by our great expences, ſhall be undone; and the end which muſt be anſwered will, in a very great meaſure, pay them for their loſſes. This politic ſcheme, which we credit them with, has been urged more than

once,

once, and it is amazing that any people, not abſolute enemies to their country, can endeavour at turning and twiſting an argument about till it gain an appearance of reaſon, only to delude us into puſillanimous meaſures.

Taxes and expences can only be called great and oppreſſive, when they are out of proportion to the general riches of a nation. To ſay a government raiſes twenty millions every year, is proving nothing, till the ſtate of the national ſtrength and riches is explained. With the poſſeſſion of ſome particular branches of trade, this kingdom is more able to bear a national debt of 100,000,000 *l.* than it is to bear half that debt without ſuch trade. If we encreaſe our national debt conſiderably, and by ſo doing gain a proportional increaſe of trade, we ſhall, at the end, be as rich, or perhaps richer, than we were with a ſmaller debt. The caſe, indeed, would be ſomewhat different if the money

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we ſpent was to circulate into foreign countries, like our ſubſidies to *German* Princes; but when *all of it* is ſpent among ourſelves, this objection vaniſhes. A *Spaniſh* war cannot impoveriſh this nation, becauſe it muſt be a *naval* one; and all the charge of our navy is paid *to ourſelves*. The nation will be as rich at the end as at the beginning of ſuch a war, as all the expence of it alternately circulates from the government to the people, and back again. This therefore is a clear proof that a naval war is, in its conſequences to us, extremely different from a land one, and much leſs detrimental in its effects.

But what can be ſaid againſt entering into ſuch a war, when we have the greateſt proſpect of ſucceſs that is poſſible? When we do it meerly to preſerve ſome important branches of our commerce that are of more worth to us than the mines of *Peru* are to the *Spaniards*? When we muſt either give up all the advantages we have gained in a bloody

bloody war, or tamely agree to the dictates of the court of *Madrid*?

I muſt be permitted to call the poſſeſſion of *North America* an article of the utmoſt importance, with regard to our commerce; ſince the conſumption of our manufactures in thoſe regions is already immenſe; much more ſo than could be conceived in ſo ſhort a time from their conqueſt; but which will not appear wonderful if we conſider the vaſt tribes of *Indians*, which are now entirely ſupplied from us. There is nothing which can enrich us more than a great demand for our manufactures; and conſequently our increaſe of trade ariſing from the poſſeſſion of all *North America*, will very well repay us for any expence we can be at in reſerving it to ourſelves.

Conſidering the vaſt force we have on foot ready to employ againſt the *Spaniards* if they go to war with us, we may very reaſonably

reaſonably hope not only to preſerve the acquiſitions we have already made from *France*, but in that caſe to add more to them. The *Spaniards* are in poſſeſſion of the iſland of *Cuba*, and half of *Hiſpaniola*; theſe iſlands, I am credibly informed, are very acceſſible; much more ſo than *Guardaloupe*; and it is not very preſumptuous to ſay, that our arms would probably be crowned with ſome conqueſt in this part of the world that would extremely well help to reimburſe us for the expences of the war. The *Philippines* iſlands in the *Eaſt-Indies* at preſent yield the *Spaniards* little or no profit; but it is well known that this is their own fault: for their value, if well managed, is prodigious. They are weak and expoſed to a degree that is ſurprizing, conſidering their importance. A ſtrong *Britiſh* ſquadron would hardly fail of making ſome impreſſion here, that might be of the greateſt advantage to this kingdom. In ſhort, the dominions of *Spain* are ſo ſcattered, ſo unweildy, and yet ſo valuable,

luable, that we could not poſſibly quarrel with any power, with a greater probability of advantage.

A *Spaniſh* war at this period, would be attended with fewer ill conſequences than at any other time. At preſent it would involve us with no other nation; but were we at peace with *France*, we ſhould in all probability ſee her join the *Spaniards*; and ſuch a power coming freſh into a war with us, in the ſituation which *France* was in before the preſent troubles, would be extremely different from *Spain*'s joining *France* at preſent. The court of *Madrid* could not have choſen a more impolitic, a more unfavorable moment to attack us: ſhe can now have no aſſiſtance that will be of any ſervice to her. In the laſt war the *French* were in a very different ſituation from what they are in at preſent. Then their fleets in a great meaſure protected the coaſts of *Spain*; but how are the times changed! Now the fleets of

Spain muſt protect the coaſts of *France*: a taſk which I believe they will find much too arduous for their power to effect.

That the maintaining the preſent peace in the ſtricteſt and moſt honourable manner, is the true intereſt of the *Spaniſh* nation, no body, I believe, will deny. What an ingenious politician ſays of the ſubject, will ſtill be the caſe if the court of *Madrid* thinks of acting ſo contrary to their real intereſts. "But after all, ſays he, the "capital and moſt dangerous inconvenience "is, their court's not being governed by "*Spaniſh* counſels; for all true politicians "will agree, that no curſe can be ſo heavy "upon a people, as to be made tools and "beaſts of burthen to any other people. "For the firſt twenty years after the ac-"ceſſion of the late king Philip, *Spain* "was in effect no better than a province "to *France*; and her condition for more "than twenty years ſince that, has been "much worſe; ſhe is become a province to

"thoſe

" thoſe which ſhe takes for her own pro-
" vinces, I mean the *Italian* dominions,
" for which ſhe has already paid ten times
" more than they are worth, and has alſo
" remained under a dependance on *France*
" for the greateſt part of that time. In
" ſhort, the Queen Dowager governed the
" King, and by ſo doing, governed *Spain*,
" with a view only to the intereſt of *Italy*;
" and this paſſion was ſo ſtrong in her, that
" all the kingdoms and provinces of the
" *Spaniſh* monarchy have been exhauſted,
" beggared, and ſacrificed to the love ſhe
" has to her own little duchies of *Parma*
" and *Placentia*.——In ſhort, we affirm,
" that the acceſſions of territory made by
" the two laſt wars, can be rendered be-
" neficial only by purſuing the principles
" before laid down; and that the real
" ſtrength, grandeur, and proſperity of
" the *Spaniſh* crown muſt be the work of
" peace, and of that mild, juſt, and equi-
" table government, to which his preſent
" Catholic Majeſty, King *Ferdinand* the
" Sixth,

" Sixth, is naturally inclined: and for the " truth of this, we appeal to time and the " judgment of poſterity."

It will not, I believe, require any more arguments to prove, how impolitic a part the *Spaniſh* miniſtry will act? to involve their country in ſo pernicious a diſpute; nor to ſet forth, in any higher colours, how utterly imprudent it would be in *Great Britain*, to give up any of the important advantages ſhe has gained in the preſent glorious war, through fear of a rupture with *Spain*; as ſuch an event muſt turn out, in all human probability, very much to the diſadvantage of the latter, and be productive of an infinite train of misfortunes, which ſhe can only ſhun by maintaining a good underſtanding with her beſt friend, the government of *Great Britain*.

FINIS.